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Abstract
This study explores the impact of government expenditure multipliers on economic growth
utilizing an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach. We provide evidence on the
short-term dynamics as well as the long-run expenditure multiplier effects on economic growth
for the Greek economy over the period 1960-2014. We find that the size of the multiplier does
not differ substantially over the phases of the business cycle. Our results also indicate that
irrespective of the scale of inflation, government expenditure positively affects economic
growth, whilst inconclusive evidence is obtained in the case of exceptionally low interest rates.
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3I. Introduction
According to traditional Keynesian theory, government expenditure is associated with
multiplier effects that could potentially lead to output gains for economic systems. However,
the demise of Keynesianism in the early 1970s had a profound impact on macroeconomic
policy in terms of the policy choices made by governments to manage their economies. The
relative importance given by authorities to monetary policy vis-à-vis fiscal policy has been
undoubtedly one of the most prominent features of recent developments in contemporary
economic policy. In this context, some commentators argue that fiscal policy has come to be
regarded as ineffectual and hence, demoted to a second class policy option (see for instance
Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Baxter and King, 1993). Inevitably, a heated debate has been
raging ever since in relation to the effectiveness of government expenditure and in particular
the efficacy of government financing during the cyclical phases of the business cycle.
The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007/08 ushered in an era of renewed speculation
concerning the role of fiscal policy in stimulating economic activity. Particular attention has
been focused on the impact of austerity measures on the Greek economy (for more on this see
Alexiou and Nellis, 2013, 2016).
In this context, the dilemma that many advanced economies are currently facing is as follows:
should government spending be used to counteract the cyclical contraction of aggregate
demand or should it be used to ensure that the fiscal budget is balanced? The answer to this
question depends on the efficacy of fiscal policy and most importantly the size of the multiplier
effect. Undoubtedly, the existing long-standing disagreement amongst economists regarding
the size of the multiplier depends on a number of factors such as the conduct of monetary
policy, the size of the marginal propensity to consume as well as the marginal propensity to
import, etc. In the wake of the financial crisis new research evidence has emerged suggesting
4that the size of the multiplier may vary with economic conditions - higher in times of recessions
and lower in periods where the economy is close to full capacity.
Ever since the onset of the global financial crisis, central banks’ policy interest rate has been
close to zero, i.e. the zero lower bound (ZLB). Rare as it might be, the ZLB is a situation where
policymakers cannot lower interest rates further to fight a looming recession. In this context, it
is legitimate to assume that the economy might exhibit unpredictable dynamics at the ZLB. As
very low interest rates are bound up with deflationary conditions, prospective increases in the
real interest rate are expected to adversely affect consumption in an already recession-stricken
economic environment (Haltom and Sarte, 2011). Given this uncommon situation, there has
been little if any investigation of fiscal policy in the ZLB state.
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing short run dynamic as well as long
run expenditure multiplier effects on economic growth for the Greek economy over the period
1960-2014. In particular, we estimate three different models in which government expenditure
interactions allow us to gauge the impact of fiscal policy in times of contraction and expansion
as well as during periods when the economy approaches the zero lower bounds for inflation
and interest rates. To this end, we use the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach to
cointegration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the theoretical aspects of
fiscal policy whilst Section 3 touches on the existing empirical approaches and evidence on
fiscal multipliers. Section 4 sets out the methodological framework whilst Section 5 presents
as well as discusses the emerging evidence. Finally, Section 6 provides some concluding
remarks.
5II. Theoretical Considerations
The effectiveness of fiscal policy is often explored in the context of the size of the multiplier,
i.e. by how much output changes following an increase in government spending or tax cuts.
The concept of the fiscal multiplier as means of boosting GDP through increases in public
investment was first introduced by Kahn in 1931 and further advanced by Keynes in 1936.
According to Chick (1983), when output in the short-run falls below the full employment level,
any reduction in wages will not be able to positively affect production and thus GDP. In times
of recession, GDP growth can be effectively brought about by increases in the overall demand.
However, given that consumption is a passive component of aggregate demand - as it
predominantly depends on income - whilst the autonomous part changes slowly over time, the
only way aggregate demand can be galvanized could be either through new private and public
investment. In this context, during recessionary periods when ‘animal spirits’ are relatively
low, an increase in public investment is ideally a potential policy initiative that promotes
recovery. The generated new income instigated by changes in public investment expenditure
is referred to as the fiscal multiplier effect.
The transformation of monetarism, particularly in the 1990s - into what many commentators
call the New Neoclassical synthesis or the New Economic Consensus (NEC) - has had
considerable implications for the conduct of monetary policy (Snowdon and Vane, 2005;
Goodfriend, 2004). This new policy orientation looks upon the setting of interest rates as the
primary policy instrument in the context of inflation targeting. More specifically, Arestis and
Sawyer (2003) argue that ‘the central bank sets its discount rate with a view to achieving the
set inflation target, but the discount rate can be considered as set relative to an “equilibrium
rate” so that the problem of aggregate demand deficiency appears to be effectively dispensed
with’ (p.4). This type of monetary policy is based on a Taylor’s rule setting of the discount rate
(Taylor, 1993) which is considered to be the best policy option to tackle both inflation and
6unemployment. They go on to challenge the effectiveness of monetary policy in the NEC
setting and suggest that fiscal policy is a more potent policy option for offsetting major changes
in the level of aggregate demand and therefore has to be reinstated as the dominant policy
approach. In the same spirit, post-Keynesians have advocated the restitution of fiscal policy
via Abba Lerner’s functional finance approach, i.e. self-financing of governments to meet
explicit objectives (see for example Arestis and Sawyer, 2003; Bell 1999; Forstater, 1999). In
this context, Tcherneva (2008) argues that functional finance can be used to increase aggregate
demand, closing the GDP gap as well as to secure full employment through direct job creation.
(for a more comprehensive critique on the conduct of monetary policy in the New Consensus
see also Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007 and Arestis, 2009).
In a different spirit, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) in a study on the impact of expansion of the
cyclically-adjusted primary balance in Denmark and Ireland found that there is a correlation
between reductions in government spending, private consumption and economic growth. In
other words, they argue that significant reductions in government spending will stimulate, via
private spending, economic activity. This effect prevails when agents expect a further reduction
in government spending and taxation because of a sharp reduction in government spending.
For Guajarado et al. (2011), however, the expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation is
overstated as changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance may be the outcome of other
developments such as non-policy changes or a boom in the stock market – hence the biased
results in favour of expansionary fiscal contraction.
The literature on the impact of public investment expenditure on economic activity is
substantial. Prior to reviewing some of the existing empirical studies in this area it would be
helpful to briefly touch on the theoretical aspects of the competing schools of thought.
According to Qazizada and Stockhammer (2014), in calculating the multiplier Keynesian
economists take into account the marginal propensity to consume, the marginal propensity to
7import and the weighted average of income tax. With the emergence of monetarism in 1968,
Friedman developed the permanent income hypothesis on the basis of which consumption
expenditure predominantly depends on permanent income that economically active citizens of
a country are expected to have during their lifetimes and not on their current income – as
advocated by Keynesians. Thus Friedman argues that an increase in public investment
financed by an increase in government borrowing causes long-term interest rates and the cost
of capital to increase which in turn crowds out investment, i.e. the so-called crowding out effect.
It is in this sense that Friedman sustains that the economy, in the case of full crowding out, will
end up back at the same level of GDP prior to the increase in public investment - but this time
shouldered with more government debt.
In this context, Barro (1989a), representing the neoclassical school of thought, introduced the
concept of the Ricardian Equivalence whereby an increase in public investment is perceived
by the public as a future increase in taxation, hence stifling consumption expenditure, i.e. the
multiplier effect will be zero. The latter provided the platform upon which Real Business Cycle
models were developed using a stochastic mathematical framework suggesting that the
multiplier effect is less than one if public expenditure is financed by taxes and zero if it is
financed by deficit spending (see for instance Barro, 1989b).
Furthermore, the new Keynesian school of thought by exposing to scrutiny the existing tenets
of the neoclassical analytical framework - in terms of failing markets, rigidity of prices and
wages, transfer costs and asymmetric information (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987) - questioned
the significance of the Ricardian equivalence, which was premised on the mere existence of
rational consumers and perfect markets. In view, therefore, of the inherent limitations of the
neoclassical model, expansionary fiscal policy assumes a great significance as a short run
policy expedient to be used during economic downturns.
8III. Empirical Approaches and Evidence on Fiscal Multiplier effects
Until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007/08, the main model extensively used for
calculating the impact of public investment on the economy was the Neo-Keynesian Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE) according to which only part of consumers’
behaviour is rational. In so far as wages and prices are rigid in a downward direction, an
increase in public expenditure in the short run will cause income and, hence, consumption to
grow. It should be noted that this type of analysis only entails short-term effects given the
neoclassical limitations and constraints of fiscal policy as well as the fact that monetary policy
is tied to the Taylor rule, i.e. a monetary-policy rule that stipulates how much the central bank
should manipulate the nominal interest rate in response to changes in inflation, output or other
economic conditions. The corresponding multipliers are therefore much lower than the
Keynesian ones.
However, one of the weaknesses of the DSGE models was their failure to factor in critical
parameters in the analysis, such as the structure and operation of the financial system, hence
providing erroneous predictions and most importantly incorrect economic policy options to
deal with the recent economic crisis - with the exception of the Eurozone countries, most
advanced economies relied on polices that fall outside the policy recommendations implied by
the DSGE model.
Regarding the methodological approaches concerning the evaluation of the multipliers, three
frameworks can be found in the empirical literature: the DSGE, the Vector Auto-Regressive
(VAR) and the single equation models.
The models pertaining to the DSGE approach impose a number of ad-hoc restrictions during
the process of modelling; for instance, state intervention is assumed to have detrimental effects
on the economic environment, hence the negative bias attached to the multiplier effects.
9The VAR modelling approach is not limited by theoretical rigidities and hence offers a more
efficient data selection process relative to other techniques. It should be stressed, however, that
on the downside of this approach one has to consider a) the inability to establish any causal
correlation between the variables and b) the use of the maximum number of variables required
given the complexity of the modelling process. A case in point is the study by Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) where only three variables are included in the estimation, i.e. GDP, public
spending and taxes.
Finally, the single equation approach has the advantage that it can incorporate numerous
variables in the model to be estimated without any theoretical limitations whilst at the same
time, by using various techniques such as Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM), endogeneity problems can be dealt with efficiently.
In the above approaches the estimated multipliers are derived on the basis of linear modelling
of the underlying equations. Amidst a number of studies in the area, Gechert and Mentges
(2013) argue that excluding financial variables from these models leads to a systematic
underestimation of the multipliers, whilst for Burriel et al. (2010), the incorporation of the
debt-to-GDP ratio in the analysis considerably affects the magnitude of the multiplier.
Moreover, using VAR modelling, Gali et al. (2007) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) provide
evidence on the basis of which the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on the US economy is
statistically significant. Ratto et al. (2009), using a DSGE approach, report smaller multiplier
effects whilst Acconcia et al. (2011), using single equation modelling, provide estimates for
the multipliers for Italy that range between 1.2 and 1.4. In more recent studies, the modelling
is conducted in a cyclical context, hence generating multiplier estimates for periods when
economies experience recession and booms respectively.
In studies where nonlinearity is explored, Parker (2011) investigates the nonlinearity of the
multiplier in the two phases of the cycle and a period where the interest rate is close to zero
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whilst Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011), using a VAR approach, generate evidence on the
basis of which the multiplier for the US economy is 2.3 in a downswing and almost zero in the
recovery phase. Similarly, De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) report nonlinear evidence for the
Spanish multipliers of 1.4 and 0.6 whilst a study by Thomakos (2012) suggests that the Greek
multipliers are 1.32 and 0 for a recession and boom respectively. Moreover, Christiano et al.
(2011), using a DSGE model for periods when the policy-determined interest rate is close to
zero, find the multipliers to range between 1.6 and 2.3 whilst Qazizada and Stockhammer
(2014) establish multipliers that range from 2.5 to 3 in a recession and from 1 to 1.5 in a boom
(a summary of pertinent studies on the impact of government expenditure multipliers in
economic growth is also provided in Table II in the Appendix).
In view of the preceding empirical evidence it can be deduced that the results reported in
various studies in the existing literature, to a certain extent, depend on the model, data and
econometric methodology utilized (Marglin and Spiegler, 2013). In this context, Perry and
Vernengo (2014) in a study on the fiscal multipliers during the Great Depression argue that
problems inherent in conventional measures of fiscal multipliers might be the reason why fiscal
policy was regarded as ineffective.
In the section below we empirically investigate the size of government expenditure multipliers
for the Greek economy during the phases of the business cycle and in the unusual context of a
zero lower bound state.
IV. Empirical Investigation
In assessing the impact of government spending on output, we estimate three regression
equations, the general form of which is expressed as follows:
   =    +      +        + 	     (    ∗  ) (     ∗  ) (     ∗  )  +    	 
[(1 −    ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  )  +    (1)
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where β0 is the constant; β1 , β2 β3 and β4 are the slope coefficients; εt is the error term satisfying
the usual assumptions, and the subscript t stands for time; yt denotes GDP growth; Xt is a vector
of other control variables such as population growth, inflation, domestic credit to the private
sector, international trade and real interest rates. The variable fce is sourced from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s website. It is constructed in accordance with the OECD’s
composite index of leading indicators, denoting periods of output contraction from the
midpoint of the period of the peak and ending at the midpoint of the period of the trough. In
other words, fce is a variable capturing periods of contraction from the period following the
peak through the trough; (fce * g) and [(1 – fce)*g] are interaction variables reflecting the
impact of spending during contraction and the impact of spending during expansion
respectively. The coefficients of these two parameters are therefore crucial in this analysis as
they reflect the elasticities, capturing the impact of spending in periods of contraction and
expansion respectively.
To explore further the expenditure effects on economic growth when inflation or interest rates
approach zero, two dummy variables have been constructed: zinf and zint taking the value of 1
when inflation and interest rates are less than 2 and 1 respectively. These are then interacted
with government expenditure to assess the impact of the latter under the two regimes. The data
used in this study have been obtained from various sources (see Table I in the Appendix for
sources and definitions of variables).
a) The Methodology
The present study employs cointegration techniques and error correction modelling (ECM).
We first make sure that the data series exhibit the right order of integration. The Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test has been extensively used in empirical studies as the first-line test when
determining the order of integration. More recent studies, however, indicate that in the presence
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of a structural break, the standard ADF tests are biased towards the non rejection of the null
hypothesis (Perron, 1997).
Having established the order of integration we then test the cointegration of the series utilizing
the bounds-testing approach within the ARDL framework. In recent years, a great deal of
research has been conducted proposing different methodologies on how to investigate long-run
equilibrium between time series variables. On the univariate front, cointegration techniques
such as the ones by Engle and Granger (1987) and Phillips and Hansen (1990) have been
applied. As for multivariate cointegration, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990)
full information maximum likelihood procedures are extensively used in empirical studies. The
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL), introduced originally by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and
further extended by Pesaran et al. (2001) and Narayan (2005) also deals with single
cointegration. This method is thought to have certain econometric advantages over other single
cointegration procedures. More specifically, endogeneity problems and the inability to test
hypotheses on the estimated coefficients in the long-run associated with the Engle-Granger
method are avoided; the long and short-run parameters of the model are estimated
simultaneously and all variables are assumed to be endogenous. This approach also obviates
the need to establish the order of integration amongst the variables, i.e. the Pesaran et al. (2001)
method can be implemented regardless of whether the underlying variables are I(0), I(1) or
fractionally integrated. It should be stressed however that one major drawback of the ARDL
approach to cointegration is that it fails to provide robust results when dealing with I(2)
variables.
To implement the ARDL approach, equation (1) is transformed to a conditional error correction
version of GDP growth and its determinants:
    =    +      
   
      +      
   
      +         +   ∆  (    ∗  ) (     ∗  ) (     ∗  )  +
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  	   
[(1 −    ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ]  +       +        +        +     
(    ∗  ) (     ∗  ) (     ∗  )   
+      [(1 −    ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ]  +    (2)
In equation (2), β1,….,β5 represents the short-run dynamics of the model, β6, and β10 represents
the long-run relationship; Δ is the first difference operator and p is the optimal lag length. 
Next, the joint hypothesis that the long-run multipliers of the lagged level variables are all
equal to zero, against the alternative that at least one is non-zero, will be tested. If a
cointegrating relationship exists, then the null hypothesis should be rejected. The long-run
relationship amongst the variables is tested by means of a bounds testing procedure coined by
Pesaran et al. (2001). This procedure is based on the F-test and is the first stage of the ARDL
cointegration method. The order of lags in the ARDL model are selected by either the Akaike
(AIC) selection criterion or the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) before the selected model
is estimated by ordinary least squares. The lag length that minimizes the AIC is selected.
Finally, the speed of adjustment ( ) to long-run equilibrium after a shock is captured by the
error correction representation which is conveyed in the following form:
    =    +      
   
      +      
   
      +         +   ∆  (    ∗  ) (     ∗  ) (     ∗  ) 
+  	    [(1 −    ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ]  + 	       (3)
The error correction component (EC) is represented by:
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   
      −    
 
   
      −         −   ∆ 
(    ∗  ) (     ∗  ) (     ∗  )  −
  	   
[(1 −    ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ] [(1 −     ) ∗  ]  (4)
V. Discussion of results
The initial step in analyzing the time series data properties is to test for unit roots by applying
a unit root with a break test (see Table I). The results suggest that we can proceed with the
ARDL methodology, i.e. there is a clear rejection of the hypothesis that the data are I(2), which
is important for the legitimate application of the bounds test.
Insert Table I
We then proceed with the specification and estimation of an ARDL model on the basis of which
the model which minimizes SIC will be chosen. The main purpose of estimating the ARDL
model is to use it as the basis for applying the bounds test.
Insert Table II
As we can see in Table II, the F-statistics for all the bounds test clearly exceed the 1% critical
value for the upper bound. Accordingly, we strongly reject the Null hypothesis of ‘no long-run
relationship’. The selection of the ARDL specifications in all three models were based on the
SIC. The maximum lag length was set to 4.
The short-run specifications of all three estimated models provide insightful dynamic
information on the underlying relationships of economic growth and the other of the
independent variables. The respective diagnostic and statistical tests indicate that our estimated
coefficients are robust and free from any problems associated with the error term (see Table
III).
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Insert Table III
As the focal point of our analysis is on the impact of expenditure multiplier effects on economic
growth, the impact of the rest of the control variables used in this study will be treated as of
secondary importance and therefore are presented here for the sake of completeness but are
mentioned only in passing. It should be stressed however that the significance and impact of
the control variables are generally in line with what theory would predict.
In all three models the overall impact of the lagged dummy interactions of government
expenditure on economic growth are found to be positive and significant. The coefficient of
the error correction term (EC-1) is found to be statistically significant in all three estimated
models, hence, confirming the existence of a long-run relationship. More specifically, the
negative and strongly significant error correction component indicates a relatively speedy
adjustment from disequilibria of the previous years’ shock, back to the long-run equilibrium in
the current year.
As can be observed in Table IV, there is not a significant difference between the values of
government expenditure multipliers over the contraction and expansion phases of the business
cycle - the size of the multiplier in contraction is 1.4 whilst in expansion it is 1.5. This finding
can be rationalized if we take into account the fact that public spending has always been the
driving force of the Greek economy irrespective of the phase of the economic cycle.
In view of the heated debate on the efficacy of central banks policy to stimulate the economy
when inflation and interest rates get close to zero, we empirically explore the ZLB state, i.e.
when inflation and interest rates and very low. The current argument would suggest that
government spending multipliers will be larger at the lower bound compared to ‘normal’ times.
Table IV reports the results associated with the ZLB state. Model 2 investigates the impact of
government spending for the periods when the inflation rate is less than 2% and model 3
investigates spending for the periods when the nominal short-term interest rate falls below the
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1% mark. In model 2 the impact of the dummy interactions is found to be positive and
significant during both phases of the cycle whilst in model 3 the generated evidence associated
with low interest rates is inconclusive. As emphasized by Christiano et al. (2011), the effects
of fiscal policy at ZLB hinge on the following two assumptions: a) downward price pressures
cause deflation over time and b) aggregate spending is highly sensitive to changes in the real
interest rate. In practice, however, it would be difficult to assess the extent to which either of
these conditions hold.
Insert Table IV
It should be stressed that the overall effect of a fiscal expansion very much depends on the state
of the economy. Keynes (1936) implied that a reduction in wages that follows moderate
austerity measures might have some galvanizing effects on the economy in so far as
profitability is restored. If, however, the austerity measures are deep and prolonged then the
effects might be disastrous, hence, creating a chaotic economic environment where the
relationships between economic variables may no longer hold. (for a comprehensive discussion
on the economic consequences of falling wages (wage trap), see also Tsoulfidis, 2010). In this
context, the fact that the IMF had to revise their estimates for the Greek economy in 2012 might
signify that the stage of the business cycle that Greece was in at the time of the recession was
not given the required policy weight. In particular, when it became apparent that Greece’s first
bailout programme was not working, the IMF and eurozone leaders agreed to a second €172bn
bailout. The programme, having assumed a low multiplier (0.5) from tax rises and government
spending cuts, failed to translate the optimism into their growth forecasts (IMF, 2013) (for
more on growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers see also Blanchard and Leigh, 2013
where the authors argue that Europe's austerity policies were founded on faulty assumptions).
In all likelihood, the recessionary economic environment that Greece has been experiencing
for many years might usher in a period of contractionary fiscal expansion – with negative
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multiplier effects – in so far as consumers’ and investors’ confidence is undermined by fiscal
sustainability concerns. It is in this context that many commentators argue that a sustainable
public debt should be dealt with prior to the implementation of any effective government
spending policy initiative.
VI. Concluding remarks
The standard growth specification models utilized in this study consist of a number of control
variables – inter alia population growth, trade, private sector debt, inflation and short-term real
interest rates – as well as expenditure interaction variables that capture the effects of fiscal
policy on economic growth. We provide estimates for the government spending multipliers
over contractions and expansions for the Greek economy using annual time series data
spanning the period 1960-2014. We also explore the zero lower bound (ZLB) theory by
subjecting government expenditure to interactions with dummies, capturing periods of low
levels of both inflation and nominal interest rates. We find that both in the short-run as well as
in the long-run, fiscal policy is an effective option that can be applied to stimulate economic
activity. As far as the size of the government expenditure multipliers is concerned we find that
they do not differ substantially over the phases of the cycle. Potentially, such a finding might
be due to the fact that public spending has always been a key policy instrument of policy makers
in Greece that has been adopted irrespective of the phase of the economic cycle.
Spilimbergo et al. (2009) argue that there are other objective factors that influence the size of
multipliers: “The size of the multiplier is larger if: a) ‘leakages’ are few (i.e., only a small
part of the stimulus is saved or spent on imports), b) the monetary conditions are
accommodative (i.e., the interest rate does not increase as a consequence of the fiscal
expansion), and c) the country’s fiscal position after the stimulus is sustainable”(p. 2).
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In the case of Greece the last two factors – namely the ECB’s monetary policy stance and the
sustainability of Greek debt – are of great significance. In particular, the ECB has always
pursued inflation targeting rather than GDP growth which is in accordance with the Taylor’s
rule on conducting monetary policy. However, in the aftermath of the 2007/08 crisis and the
concomitant deflationary spiral, attention has been shifted to GDP targeting as well. As far as
the second factor is concerned - debt sustainability - we would argue that this is not sustainable
and more steps should be taken to ensure its viability.
Finally, the evidence we present here also indicates that the in the low-inflation bound regime
the expenditure interactions positively affect economic growth, whilst inconclusive evidence
is obtained in the case of a low interest rate regime. Notwithstanding, it should be appreciated
that fiscal policy may not be the only galvanizing alternative at the ZLB. Many commentators
have suggested that central monetary authorities can potentially influence longer-term interest
rates by purchasing large amounts of long-term assets, hence committing to higher inflation
targets or to finding ways to mimic the conditions of negative interest rates. The effectiveness
of these however are the subject of intense and ongoing debate.
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TABLES
Table I: Unit Root Test with Breakpoint
ADF
Variables Levels
t-stat (p-values)
First Difference
t-stat (p-values)
TB Order of
integration
gdp -5.004 (0.001)* - 2007 I(0)
g -5.614 (0.001)* - 1979 I(0)
inf -1.722 (0.414) -7.013 (0.01)* 1973 I(1)
cre -2.608 (0.866) -6.887 (0.01)* 1998 I(1)
x/m -3.342 (0.478) -7.272 (0.001)* 1982 I(1)
pop -3.661 (0.301) -6.727 (0.001)* 1976 I(1)
int -2.771 (0.800) -9.276 (0.01)* 1975 I(1)
Notes: Vogelsang (1993) asymptotic one-sided p-values are given in parenthesis; TB denotes
the break date; (****), (**), (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively;
lag length was determined by the SIC (maximum lag length: 10); respective dummies have
been used accordingly to capture the breaks suggested by the test.
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Table II: Bounds test for cointegration
Model 1 Model 2(inf<=2) Model 3(int<=1)
F-statistic 10.88 4.81 8.26
Critical Value Bounds I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
at 1% significance level 2.96 4.26 2.96 4.26 2.96 4.26
26
Table III. ARDL estimation results: Short-run dynamics and error correction
Model 1 Model 2 (inf<=2) Model 3 (int<=1)
ARDL(3,4,3,4,2,4,3,4) ARDL(3,4,4,3,4,4,4,3) ARDL(4,3,4,1,1,4,1,4)
Variables coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
D(gdp(-1)) -0.011 (-0.086) 0.335 (1.86)* 0.022 (0.24)
D(gdp(-2)) -0.212 (-3.69)*** -0.151 (-1.21) -0.003 (-0.30)
D(gdp(-3)) 0.301 4.57***
D(cre) -0.151 (-2.52)*** -0.192 (-1.84) -0.261 (-4.43)***
D(cre(-1)) -0.165 (-2.64)*** -0.357 (-3.04)*** -0.227 (-2.85)***
D(cre(-2)) 0.038 (-0.71) 0.03 (0.33) 0.208 (3.31)***
D(cred(-3)) 0.088 (1.88)* 0.132 (1.57)
D(pop) 1.552 (1.81)* 2.936 (1.87)* 2.061 (1.72)
D(pop(-1)) -5.378 (-3.71)*** 1.355 (0.58) -2.382 (-1.98)*
D(pop(-2)) 2.231 (2.96)*** -4.277 (-1.83)* 1.501 (1.31)
D(pop(-3)) 1.012 (1.92)* -1.302 (-1.65)
D(x/m) 0.051 (3.98)*** -0.191 (-1.58) -0.089 (-6.85)***
D(x/m(-1)) 0.009 (0.99) -0.092 (-2.48)***
D(x/m(-2)) -0.027 (-0.86) 0.137 (3.34)***
D(x/m(-3)) -0.017 (-2.69)***
D(inf) -0.431 (-7.02)*** -0.191 (-1.15) -0.521 (-7.49)***
D(inf(-1)) 0.146 (0.15) -0.242 (-1.57)
D(inf(-2)) 0.209 (1.49)
D(inf(-3)) -0.436 (-3.56)***
D(int) -0.252 (-4.06)*** -0.362 (-2.55)*** -0.333 (-4.52)***
D(int(-1)) 0.121 (1.45) -0.074 (-0.44) 0.201 (2.63)***
D(int(-2)) 0.09 (1.19) 0.145 (0.91) -0.045 (-0.56)
D(int(-3)) 0.09 (1.23) -0.199 (-1.28) 0.177 (2.45)***
Interactions of Government Spending with Contraction Dummy (fce)
D(fce*g) 0.097 (0.43)
D(fce*g(-1)) -0.621 (-1.97)*
D(fce*g(-2)) 1.13 (4.78)***
D[(1-fce)*g] -0.082 (-0.37)
D[(1-fce)*g(-1)] -0.515 (-1.67)
D[(1-fce)*g(-2)] 1.055 (4.39)***
D[(1-fce)*g(-3)] 0.177 (3.36)***
Interactions of Government Spending with Nominal Lower Bound (zinf)
D(zinf*g) 0.015 (0.33)
D(zinf*g(-1)) -0.062 (-2.14)**
D(zinf*g(-2)) 1.268 (3.57)***
D(zinf*g(-3)) -1.627 (-3.31)***
D[(1-zinf)*g] 0.209 (1.83)*
D[(1-zinf)*g(-1)] 0.328 (2.35)***
D[(1-zinf)*g(-2)] -0.251 (-1.65)
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Interactions of Government Spending with Nominal Lower Bound (zint)
D(zint*g) -1.726 (-5.19)***
D(zint*g(-1)) 0.511 (1.51)
D(zint*g(-2)) 0.292 (0.99)
D(zint*g(-3)) 2.044 4.19***
D[(1-zint)*g] 0.123 (2.13)**
D(fce) -3.655 (-5.37)*** -4.052 (-4.48)*** -3.799 (-7.16)**
D(zinf) -1.599 (-4.09)***
D(zint) -2.814 (-6.45)***
EC-1 -1.377 (-7.23)*** -1.014 (-3.58)*** -0.971 (-7.65)***
R2 - adjusted 0.97 0.92 0.96
F-statistic 51.36 16.87 38.67
DW-statistic 2.181 2.024 2.213
Note: (***), (**), (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
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Table IV. Long-run estimates
Model 1 Model 2 (inf<=2) Model 3 (int<=1)
Variables coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic coefficient t-statistic
cre -0.013 (-0.42) 0.044 (0.81) -0.057 (-2.92)***
pop -0.656 (-1.04) 0.031 (0.01) 1.653 (1.46)
x/m -0.021 (-1.88)* -0.058 (-1.22) -0.062 (-4.19)***
inf -0.503 (14.26)*** 0.118 (0.67) -0.389 (-7.96)***
int -0.219 (-4.39)*** 0.071 (0.42) -0.348 (-5.98)***
fce*g 0.228 (4.48)***
(1-fce)*g 0.254 (3.18)***
zinf*g 0.971 (3.13)***
(1-zinf)*g 0.618 (2.08)*
zint*g -0.206 (-0.94)
(1-zint)*g 0.061 (0.65)
fce -2.654 (-3.54)*** -3.99 (-2.74)*** -3.914 (-4.46)***
constant 12.313 (13.412)*** 1.723 (0.32) 14.962 (8.35)***
Long-run Government Expenditure Multipliers1
Contraction multiplier 1.4 Expansion multiplier 1.5
Diagnostic tests for the underlying ARDL specifications
Serial Correlation 0.167 0.519 0.231
Normality 0.768 0.362 0.562
Heteroscedasticity 0.425 0.143 0.267
Note: 1 The multipliers have been calculated using the formula:   =     
  
 
   
,     
  
=
 	
   
 
; the G/GDP ratio over the entire period is 0.16; (***), (**), (*) denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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APPENDIX
Table I. Definition of variables
Variables Definition Source
gdp Real GDP Growth Rate AMECO
G Government Final Expenditure, Growth rate AMECO
cre Domestic Credit to Private Sector / GDP World Bank
pop Population growth rate AMECO
x/m Ratio of exports over imports AMECO
inf Inflation rate AMECO
int Short term real interest rates Bank of Greece
nint Nominal short term interest rate Bank of Greece
fce Periods of contraction from the period following the
peak through the trough
Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis
zinf Dummy variable: when inflation < 2% Author
zint Dummy variable: when nominal interest rates are < 1% Author
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Table II. Summary of recent studies estimating government expenditure multiplier effects
Country/ies Author(s) Spending multiplier estimates
GREECE Monokrousos and Thomakos (2012)
(sample period: 2000 – 2012)
1.32 (during recession)
near zero (during normal times)
GREECE IMF (2013)
(sample period: 2008 – 2013)
0.5 (during recession)
> 1 (revised figure - during
recessions)
ITALY Acconcia et al. (2011)
(sample period: 1990-1999)
1.2 - 1.4
SPAIN De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013)
(sample period: 1986 – 2012)
1.4 (during recession)
0.6 (during normal times)
USA Perotti (2005)
(sample period: 1960 – 2001)
1.29 - 1.4 (in the pre-1980s)
0.36 - 0.28 (in the post-1980s)
USA Gali et. al. (2007);
(sample period: 1948 - 2003)
0.78 - 1.74
USA Fatas and Mihov (2001)
(sample period: 1960 – 1996)
0.7 - 1.74
USA Christiano et al. (2011)
(sample period: 2000 – 2010)
1.6 - 2.3 (when zero-bound)
< 1 (when nominal interest rate
follows Taylor rule)
USA Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
(sample period:1960 – 1997)
0.9 - 1.29
EMU Burriel et al. (2010)
(sample period: 1981 – 2007)
0.87 - 0.85
56 Countries Turini et al (2012)
(sample period: 1970 – 2008)
0.8 (during recession)
0.2 (during normal times)
98 Countries Afonso et al. (2010)
(sample period: 1981 – 2007)
0.6 - 1.1 (multipliers during
recession and normal times not
statistically different from each
other)
21 Advanced
economies
Qazizada and Stockhammer (2014)
(sample period: 1979 – 2011)
1 (during expansion);
up to 3 (during contractions);
no difference in the impact of
spending during nominal zero
lower bound periods.
